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Jesse Taylor practices in state and federal court, with experience in complex contract, real estate, mass tort, and qui tam litigation. Jesse also represented a major credit reporting agency in numerous consumer FCRA disputes. Prior to joining Squire Patton Boggs, he worked as a litigation associate in another top 20 international law firm. Previously, Jesse served as a law clerk to the Honorable Judith E. Levy, US District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, and to the Honorable James G. Carr, US District Court, Northern District of Ohio. In addition to his law firm experience and clerkships, Jesse worked as the online communications director for the Office of the Governor of Ohio.

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The latest entry in a nearly decade-long dispute between a plaintiff and his former employer and manager, Mattiaccio v. DHA Grp., Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129464 (D.D.C. July 21, 2020) is an in-depth analysis of standing under the FCRA in the face of unclear pleading by a pro se litigant.

The Mattiaccio plaintiff

In Ostreicher v. TransUnion, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109279 (S.D.N.Y.), the plaintiff filed suit in federal court claiming that a variety of defendants, including a credit reporting agency (“CRA”) and various furnishers, inaccurately reported certain information.  One of the furnishers moved to compel arbitration based on the cardmember agreement governing the relationship between

In Frank v. Autovest, LLC, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18082 (9th Cir. June 9, 2020), the Ninth Circuit addressed a thorny standing issue under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”): does a consumer who alleges harm from a technical violation of the FDCPA have standing to continue her suit when her deposition testimony shows

Standing to bring suit is an issue that is never waived and never goes away, regardless of the parties’ arguments.  Recently, the Ninth Circuit reviewed an appeal of an FCRA claim that had gone through discovery, summary judgment, and a fully briefed appeal.  It determined that the parties and the lower court had focused on

In Stewart v. Credit Control, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81332, the Northern District of Illinois dismissed a pro se claim against a debt collector.  The plaintiff claimed that the debt collector, who pulled the plaintiff’s credit information to facilitate collection of a debt, lacked a “permissible purpose” for obtaining his information.

In addressing

To sue, you must have standing.  To have standing, you must have an actual, concrete injury.  In 2011, Experian accidentally gave a lender a list of prescreened consumers.  The consumer found out about this disclosure five years later, after an attorney told him about it.  The consumer admitted that the disclosure didn’t affect his credit, and couldn’t dispute that he probably got (and threw away) the offer the lender would have made to that list of customers.  Still, he sued, claiming that the disclosure breached his privacy and caused him emotional distress.  Experian, refusing to sit on its laurels, filed a counterclaim based on the consumer’s possession of the 2011 disclosure.  The district court determined that nobody had standing, and tossed the entire case.  Both parties appealed.

Continue Reading No Actual Leg to Stand On: Seventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Consumer’s FCRA Suit and Experian’s Counterclaim for Lack of Article III Standing